# CHARISMA

Charles Lindholm

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## Acknowledgments

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This book is dedicated to my father, Wilbur T. Lindholm, with love and respect.
PART I

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1969 the brutal murders committed in Southern California by the followers of Charles Manson riveted the attention of the American public. The apparently senseless killings of ten people were explained by the media as the result of the strange hypnotic power exercised by Manson, who had convinced the disciples that he was Christ incarnate. Manson, in response, argued that he was nothing more than a mirror, reflecting society's own dark fantasies.

Nearly ten years later, the residents of Jonestown, a commune isolated in the jungles of Guyana, killed a visiting member of the United States House of Representatives and some of his entourage. Then, at the request of their leader, Jim Jones, nearly all of the hundreds of men, women and children of the Temple drank cyanide-laced kool-aid and died in the greatest mass suicide of modern history. At first it was assumed that the suicides were forced, but evidence indicated instead that these people willingly killed themselves and their children in order to accompany their beloved leader, whom they worshipped as a god on earth.

Behind these frightening outbursts lurks the specter of Adolf Hitler who inspired his supporters to similar violent acts, and who also proclaimed himself a living god. But where Manson touched only a few dozen followers, and Jones less than a thousand, Hitler inflamed an entire nation with his paranoid vision, precipitating the greatest war and the most horrible atrocities of the century.

In these terrible events, the concepts of cult, charisma, and diabolical evil seem inextricably intertwined. Our fear of such Hitler-like movements has been reawakened by the rise of religious fanaticism as a mode of government on the international scene, while domestic incidents of mob violence and hatred, as well surges of apparently irrational cultic fervor, undermine our faith in the power of reason. Even within the mainstream of Western society, passionate evangelical figures exhorting their congregations from television screens stir apprehensions about the rationality of the public, and about the possibility of resurgent cultism. Such movements make it hard to believe that human beings—at least human beings in groups gripped by enthusiasm—are reasonable creatures.
In fact, it is evident that leaders such as Hitler, Jones and Manson exert an influence on their followers that goes far beyond ordinary logic or self-interest. Immersed in a crowd that seems to have a dynamic of its own, the followers are completely devoted to their leader and are prepared to do anything he commands—even kill others, or themselves. Meanwhile, the individuals who inspire this incredible loyalty appear to the public in general as extraordinary half-mad figures, driven by violent rages and fears that would seem to make them repellent rather than attractive, while their messages look, from the perspective of the outsider, to be absurd mélanges of half-digested ideas, personal fantasies, and paranoid delusions.

How is it possible to understand these extraordinary occurrences? This question has been one that has fascinated me for a very long time, partly because of the importance of charismatic relations in recent history, partly because of the intellectual challenge such movements offer to social theory. But the problem of understanding charisma and the mentality of the group also has personal relevance because I know something of it from my own experiences, experiences which I share, at least to a degree, with many of my generation.

My first awareness of the raw impersonal power of a group was during student riots in the late sixties. I was momentarily lost in the excitement of a violent crowd, and found myself facing armed policemen, who became in turn an equally angry mob. The riot that ensued was frightening, but also exhilarating, as the participants lost their inhibitions against violence along with their "instinct" of self-preservation in the confrontation. During this same era, I also witnessed the transformation of apparently ordinary, reasonable people into acolytes who wore ludicrous uniforms, practiced odd rituals and proclaimed their exotic leaders to be avatars of God on earth. These devotees told me with their faces shining that they had discovered meaning and great happiness in their attachment to these living deities. Their conversion made me realize that people were not only vulnerable to momentary immersion in a riot, but also to radical involvement in new and completely involving life courses. Reality was far more malleable than I had imagined, and my own perceptions of what was reasonable and rational had to be rethought.

A third factor derived from my travels through South Asia after I graduated from college. My idea was that in a different society, surviving without the baggage of my own identity, I could live more intensely and escape from the alienation I felt from American culture. But I dis-
covered even more poignantly the degree to which my worldview was limited, and how little I understood the well-springs of people's actions.

This revelation led me to study anthropology in order to learn how to put my experiences of other worlds and cultural standards into social and historical perspective. And, to a degree, this effort was successful. However, when I did my fieldwork in northern Pakistan, I found that the tribal people I worked among, although almost fanatically egalitarian, had periodic charismatic revivals, where nearly the whole population would rise and follow an ecstatic religious practitioner. This made me wonder about the paradoxical connection between egalitarianism and charismatic involvement, and more generally about the role of passion in arousing collective action within a specific cultural context.

As a result of these personal experiences I became interested in the study of charisma as the source for emotionally grounded action. The collective energies and selfless communal fervor I had felt in the riots of the sixties seemed to me to be best understood in terms of the dynamics of a charismatic group, and charismatic leadership certainly had impelled a few of my friends to become immersed in cults. I also believed that it is not through rational argument, but primarily through forms of charismatic commitment, that people achieve the levels of self-sacrifice necessary for revolution and social transformation.

But what meaning did any of this have? Was the word "charisma" just a way to categorize and thereby pretend to capture an emotional experience that is really completely inexplicable? A number of commentators have argued that this is indeed the case—that charisma is actually a meaningless term, completely useless for analysis. Unfortunately, they put nothing in its place, and we are left with the naked events, and bereft even of a word to describe them. The question then is whether we can discover the outline of a theoretical framework within the discourse about charisma that can help us make sense of what appears senseless. We can begin this task by asking just what is entailed in the popular definition of charisma.

Virtually unknown a generation ago, the word "charisma" is now a part of the vocabulary of the general public, and obviously fills a felt need to conceptualize and categorize exactly the sorts of cultic commitments and extraordinary crowd phenomenon I mentioned above. However, its meaning has been extended to cover not only the astonishing commitment of cultists and fa-
natics, not only the fervor of the mob, but also the adulation offered to glamorous movie stars, exciting sports heroes, and Kennedyesque politicians—adulation which goes far above mere admiration of someone with special expertise.¹

Nor does the popular use of the term stop there. The social theorist Bertrand de Jouvenel echoes mass opinion when he explains that informal relationships in any group are a product of one individual's "naked capacity of mustering assent," a capacity that has nothing to do with position, or power, or advantage, but emanates solely from an inherent personal magnetism (1958: 163). When a such a person enters a room, heads turn, and those who are without this magical attribute press to be close to the one who has it; they want to be liked by her, to have her attention, to touch her. The hearts of the onlookers race when the attractive other comes near. This capacity is thus a quality admired and envied; and imagined, perhaps accurately, to lead to success in love and work. In the West, we define and "explain" this felt magnetic attractiveness of others by referring to it as "charisma".

Even in the most intimate personal relationships the concept of charisma is used, since the powerful attraction of the beloved in the first flush of romantic love is also portrayed in Western popular culture as "charismatic." The beloved, in romantic imagery, is understood as having the same sort of intrinsic magnetic quality, outside the range of ordinary thought and logic, and is believed by the lover to be special, extraordinary, remarkable in every way. Because of these imputed qualities, the lover wants to obey the beloved, just as the follower wants to obey the leader. The parallel between love and charisma is deep, and I will return to it in the conclusion.

But for the moment, I simply want to argue that in Western culture the idea of charismatic attraction is a way of talking about certain emotionally charged aspects of social interaction, both at the level of mass movements, and in small-scale, everyday social life. At each level, from the personal to the public, there remains the concept of a compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie linking a group of followers together in adulation of their leader, or tying lover to the beloved, which is commonly symbolized in the imagery of charisma.

In my analysis, I accept the subjective validity of these moments—I do not wish to "explain" charismatic attraction as an illusion, or deny it by claiming it to be a reflection of some-
thing more fundamental. Instead, my effort will be to understand what involvement in a charismatic movement means emotionally and psychologically for leaders and followers.

There are limits, however. Even though I am an anthropologist, in this book I stay primarily within a Western context, though I do use material from very simple non-Western societies as a base-line for comparison. Cross-cultural research into more complex social formations would indubitably be useful for developing a more complete theory of charisma, but I felt that what was needed first was a model built from the material that is the most familiar to us, and is most readily available.

Secondly, the study is unfortunately quite male-centered. This is a consequence of the ethnographic accounts, which are almost always about male leaders, and because of a male bias in the theoretical and popular models of charisma. The study of charismatic women is a task I have not been able to undertake, though I hope my work will provide a base for later research.

Let me begin then by assuming that popular discourse about the subjective experience of charisma reflects a reality that must be taken seriously. Obviously crucial to this popular imagery of charisma is the presence of a compelling charismatic individual whose innate qualities attract others. This magnetic quality that is the essence of charisma is one that a few people are thought to "have" as a part of their basic character; charisma is not learned—it exists, just as height or eye color exist.

But unlike physical characteristics, charisma appears only in interaction with the vast majority of others who lack it. In other words, even though charisma is thought of as something intrinsic to the individual, a person cannot reveal this quality in isolation. It is only evident in interaction with those who are effected by it. Charisma is, above all, a relationship, a mutual mingling of the inner selves and leader and follower. Therefore, it follows that if the charismatic is able to compel, the follower has a matching capacity for being compelled, and we need to consider what makes up the personality configuration of the follower, and well as that of the leader, if we are to understand charisma.

There is yet another aspect aside from the mutual interaction of leader and follower. Since the crowd gathered around the leader (or the lover attracted to the beloved) has particular characteristics of excitability, selflessness and emotional intensity which are beyond those of the
ordinary consciousnesses of the individuals involved, and because the attracted feel their personal identities lost in their worship of the charismatic other, charisma in Western society is felt to be a "strong force," as physicists say; it binds people together in ways that transcend and transmogrify the selves of the followers—and, quite possibly, the self of the leader as well.

Understanding charisma thus implies studying not only the character of the charismatic and the attributes that make any particular individual susceptible to the charismatic appeal, but an analysis as well of the dynamic of the charismatic group itself in which the leader and follower interact. This dynamic, we can note from the outset, is felt to be one that is extremely powerful and strikingly ambivalent, greatly desired and greatly feared, and is morally conceived both as the peak of altruistic love and as the abyss of violent fanaticism.

Finally, we can also say that charisma has an implicit structural form as a process that takes place over time and under certain conditions, as participants become more or less committed, fall in and out of love. And, since it is evident as well that charismatic commitment varies not only for a particular follower and leader, but is more prevalent in some historical periods than others, and appears more among some social groups than others, we also need to contextualize any study of it, showing the connection between circumstances and the prospects of a charismatic relation.

Obviously, the notion of charisma, though amorphous, does have a content that offers the parameters for further analysis. And it is from this basic concept that I start the task of making sense of the subjective experience of charisma by exploring theoretical paradigms, some of which attempt to understand the appeal of the leader; others focus on the dynamic of the group; and others again which try to develop a synthetic and contextual model of charismatic excitement. And, as we shall see, like the popular conceptualizations, all of these theories have a moral content, seeing in charisma either salvation, or damnation.

My purpose in this survey in not to write an essay in the history of ideas, but something more pragmatic; that is, the extraction of a model of the emotions that can provide us both with a rudimentary paradigm for hierarchizing basic human needs, and allow us to conceptualize the complex historical, social and psychological aspects of the extraordinary experience of selflessness and transcendence that we mean when we say "charisma."
Having formulated a way of thinking about the charismatic experience, the next section uses cases to test how well this model works. As my ethnographic illustrations I have chosen some of the most excessive instances of charisma in the modern era and contrasted them with each other, and with the simplest forms of charismatic revelation in small scale societies. The movements which coalesced around Charles Manson, Jim Jones and Adolf Hitler will be placed against the examples of charisma offered by shamanism and the group trance of the !Kung Bushmen. By analyzing this varied material and by using first-person accounts, I will try to discover the inner dynamic that binds the leaders and the group, and the way this interaction is constructed by the social context.

In the concluding chapter, I consider ways in which the impulse to self-loss and charismatic participation is diffused and domesticated in modern society through alternatives such as identification with the nation, hero worship, religion, and especially through intimate personal relationships. I also discuss the possibility that, if alternative forms for achieving a momentary escape from the prison of the self are delegitimized, charismatic relations are likely to have a greater influence and a more central place in the future. If this is so, then it especially necessary to understand what this experience entails.

Let me begin then at the beginning, and introduce the reader to the ideas that can help us to construct a model for charisma.
PART II

THEORY
Chapter 2

"Human Beings As They Really Are": Social Theories of the Passions

Making a convincing model of charismatic attraction rests on producing an equally convincing model of the roots of human action. Trying to develop such a model has not only been a preoccupation of Western thought but also has inspired and exasperated thinkers and dreamers in every human society. The effort to resolve this existential question lies at the core of all religion and myth, where human life is imagined as a struggle to reach a higher end, escaping the boundaries of humanity as it is to become humanity as it might be.

In modern Western society, however, the erosion of tradition and the collapse of accepted religious belief leaves us without a telos, a sanctified notion of humanity's potential. Bereft of a sacred project we have only a demystified image of a frail and fallible humanity no longer capable of becoming god-like. Niccolo Machiavelli was perhaps the first to articulate this new, disenchanted, pragmatic perspective when he promised his Princely patron that he would describe human beings not as they ought to be, not as they wish they were, but "as they really are." His ambition too was practical. Only by understanding and manipulating the unadorned and unappetizing reality of the human condition, he said, can the Prince hope to rule, and society gain stability. The unflattering portrait he drew of human cowardice and greed may be contested. Nonetheless, the effort Machiavelli made to replace the sacred teleological ideal with a more realistic image of humanity "as it is" has continued to be the general thrust of Western social thought.

However, this "naturalistic" concept of humanity is threatened by the phenomenon of the charismatic relationship, wherein the followers make exactly the claim that modern social thought denies, namely, that the leader is a deity, and that membership in the charismatic group surrounding the leader offers a vitalizing telos in itself. But as modern, rational observers we cannot permit the participant's attribution of a supernatural aura to the leader to be an explanation for the charismatic state, even though we must give credence to the subjective reality of the leader's holiness for the follower. If we are not to succumb to canonization (or demonization) of the object of our study we must instead begin with the Machiavellian premise of a demystified and disenchanted human character.
The Triumph of Passion Over Reason: David Hume

But what does this naturalistic model of humanity consist of? At least from the time of the Greeks, Western thought has portrayed human beings as double creatures torn by a war between passion and reason. There are then two choices for making a "realistic" image of humanity. The first approach is to place the human capacity for reason in the forefront. From Plato, and on through the Christian tradition and into the Enlightenment, this has been the general strategy. The passions have been regarded as inchoate internal drives, felt rather than known, which impel men and women to act, often against their better judgement.\(^1\) Reason then has been invoked as a superior faculty with the power to rein in the passions and turn them to higher ends. Within this vision, reason is given sacred qualities; mankind, although dragged down by brute desire, could be redeemed by the intellectual quest for unity with divine rationality.

But the reign of reason proved susceptible to the assaults that bombarded it as the traditional view of the world lost its accepted validity and coherence, allowing the emergence of disquieting skepticism about the taken-for-granted foundations of daily experience. Rene' Descartes had already written in the early 17th century that:

Inasmuch as reason persuades me already that I must avoid believing things which are not entirely certain and indubitable, no less carefully than those things which seem manifestly false, the slightest ground for doubt that I find in any, will suffice for me to reject all of them.... The destruction of foundations necessarily brings down with it the rest of the edifice (1972: 95).

At the same time, Blaise Pascal asserted that the best reason can do is to realize that all human beliefs are founded on nature, custom and habit. Reason, Pascal argued, is primarily a calculative faculty, only capable of speaking of means, never of ends, and is easily swayed by circumstances. In dethroning reason, Pascal hoped to stimulate a renewed faith in a higher transcendent religious truth, but instead he laid the groundwork for a new perspective that recognizes only personal sensations and emotions.

This second strategy for understanding human beings is associated especially with David Hume,\(^2\) who set out not only to destroy the traditional reign of reason, but also to replace it with the primacy of feelings. "I shall endeavour," he wrote in 1737, "to prove first, that reason alone
can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (1978: 413). And a few pages later, even more radically, he claims that "reason is, and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (1978: 415).

Hume justified his position by taking a strongly empiricist view of human nature. The consciousnesses of men and women, he said, are nothing more than "a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (Hume 1978: 252). The apparent continuity and coherence of the world that is at the heart of rational thought is an illusion, a result of innumerable separate reflective impressions arising in response to the sensations caused in the individual by external sources or by the inner workings of the body. Therefore, one cannot convincingly argue for any reliable regularity or taken-for-granted systemic coherence whatsoever.

Hume showed reason to be in the power of passion, and that each passion is equally valid as a reflection of multiple sensations; furthermore, because of differing experiences and histories each person will have different passions, Humean philosophy thus effectively disintegrated all belief systems that claimed to rest upon received wisdom or transcendent inspiration. In this way Hume contributed to validating the demystification of tradition and religion, while providing as well a philosophical basis for the pragmatic data collection and debunking spirit characteristic of the scientific method.

But primarily Hume hoped by his argument to discredit moral extremism and emotionally compelling rhetoric and to plead for tolerance and moderation. In this he was reacting not only against the prejudices and rigid morality of his own bigoted Scottish Calvinist upbringing, but also against the larger climate of the preceding century, when European society had been rent asunder by kings passionately bent on gaining their own personal glory through the force of arms, and by civil wars between religious fanatics possessed by fervent belief in their own versions of holy truth.

Hume was temperamentally repulsed by such excesses. He described himself as "a man of mild Dispositions, of Command of Temper, of an open, social and cheerful Humour, capable of Attachment, but little susceptible of Enmity, and of great Moderation in all Passions" (quoted
in Letwin 1965: 17). He was repelled by the fiery ardor that burned in the hearts of the Huguenot Prophets and by the zeal of the crowds of Levellers of the previous generation. And we can be certain that he was horrified by the convulsions of the Jansenists (who were active in Paris while he was in France in 1734) and the equally extraordinary paroxysms of the Methodists in England (which began in 1739).

Hume was completely unable to sympathize with the motivations behind these effusive displays of enthusiasm, and attributed them to hypocrisy. "Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts which they entertain on such subjects. They make a merit of implicit faith; and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by the strongest asseverations and the most positive bigotry" (Hume 1964, Vol 2: 348). From his point of view, all intense emotional states are simply invitations to danger:

The most sprightly wit borders on madness, the highest effusions of joy produce the deepest melancholy, the most ravishing pleasures are attended with the most cruel lassitude and disgust, the most flattering hopes make way for the severest disappointments. And, in general, no course of life has such safety (for happiness is not to be dreamed of) as the temperate and moderate, which maintains as far as possible, a mediocrity, a kind of insensibility in everything (Hume quoted in Letwin 1965: 77).

But even though strong passions are perilous, Hume thought they could be controlled easily and with little social disruption. He assumed that most people's desires would naturally be relatively harmless, like his own. As Ernest Gellner asks, "With such passions, who would not gladly be their slave" (quoted in J. A. Hall 1987: 72). Any disruptive violent feelings could be balanced by cultivating inherently calming passions, such as avarice, which had the virtue of being doggedly methodical and conducive to social order (Hirschman 1977).

In consequence, despite the apparent radicalism of his philosophy, Hume was in fact a relatively conservative Hanoverian gentleman who preached tolerance, who opposed all forms of zeal in favor of the pleasures of good company, and who believed the public would naturally realize the necessity of following social rules and maintaining decorum for the purpose of enjoying their mild personal desires with the minimum of interference. For him, understanding "men as
they are" meant diversity, adaptation to circumstances, balancing of desires, a willingness to accept compromises.

**Passion and Teleology: the Utilitarians**

Hume's contemporaries and successors have struggled ever since with the logical implications of his empiricism, while simultaneously attempting to make some moral order out of the motley realm of pure sensation he had presented them as a substitute for a coherent world ruled by divine rationality. On the one hand, in Germany Immanuel Kant reacted by attempting to resuscitate the power of reason through his claim for the existence of categorical imperatives which every human being will necessarily understand and act upon. This essential imperative is expressed in the famous maxim that one should treat oneself and others as an end, not as a means. What this signifies is that one should influence others by offering rational reasons for acting, thus giving credit to the rationality and freedom of the other, and one should refrain from influencing others in non-rational ways, thereby denying the other's rationality and agency.

But Kant's effort was bound to fail, both logically and practically. Logically it floundered because it is perfectly possible for a person to say "let everyone else be treated as a means, let me be treated as an end." And practically it is evident, as we shall see in the course of this volume, that people are often more than willing to be convinced by non-rational arguments, while rational discourse often fails dismally to achieve any consensus.3

In England, on the other hand, Hume's premises gained greater acceptance. In particular, Jeremy Bentham, starting from Hume's argument in favor of the primacy of sensation, claimed to have discovered in the passions a new teleology to replace the discarded sacred framework. Where Hume saw multiple desires, Bentham's contribution was to reduce them to two: the desire to avoid pain, and the desire to gain pleasure. The next step then was to calculate what acts and policies would give the most pleasure and the least pain, and Bentham bent his astonishing energies to discovering a psychology that could measure the duration, intensity and amount of these primary sensations in order to build a social system in which everyone's pleasure would be scientifically maximized according to the principles of his new science of Utilitarianism.
As the Utilitarian theory developed, the Humean premise of incommensurate and varied personal feelings was more and more attenuated and disguised; thinkers dismayed by the confusion implicit in Hume's picture of human nature attempted to build instead a more orderly model of society by increasingly constricting their vision of natural desires and passions. The culmination of this tendency came when Adam Smith argued that the pursuit of wealth meets all the deepest needs of the human beings.4

This constriction had highly significant consequences, since it meant that the character of humans, derived from the essential passion of greed, was portrayed by Utilitarians as dogged, methodical, predictable and self-aggrandizing; a far cry from, for instance, the selfless and fiery, but evanescent, involvement of passionate love.

As a result of this narrowed psychology, social interaction was now imagined to be constructed through a series of rational calculations for the sake of maximizing personal desires (utility functions) in a world of other competing maximizers. The advantage of this severe reduction of the passions to avarice was that theorists could now envision human life as economic exchange, susceptible to the same kinds of rule-like mathematical formulae as the rest of the market.

In this image of humanity each individual is regent, a small island empire with special needs, wants, and desires. But it is assumed that each imperial individual will be able to calculate trade offs in the value of any object, including the value of personal relationships, and it assumes as well that there will be consistency in relationships and exchanges. This concept of humans as self-interested rational calculators coincides too with a belief in functionalism, that is, that every part has its place within the larger whole as the orderly "unseen hand" of the marketplace maintains social equilibrium and a moral world despite the struggle of each against all.

But the rub is that this apparently simple philosophy rests, as we have seen, on a shifting base. Utility seems concrete enough, but the common-sense premise of utility actually disguises the fact that pleasures derived from the disparate emotional desires of individuals are polymorphous, complex, and often contradictory. Within the atomizing mode of thought provided by empiricism there is no way to rank pleasures or place them within any hierarchy, nor can the pursuit of one pleasure instead of another be logically validated or justified. Furthermore, the taken-
for-granted world, even as it is desacralized and placed within the frame of the marketplace, proves to be less functional, less consistent and less reducible to rational calculation of means to ends than the more vulgar Utilitarians imagined.5

Aside from its deep logical difficulties, in practice Utilitarianism suffered considerable setbacks when Bentham found his ameliorative social schemes repudiated by the aristocracy who ought to have, by his logic, realized their utility. Meanwhile, the French Revolution shattered the Utilitarian image of the primacy of acquisitiveness and calculation in human nature. Under the inflaming influence of Revolutionary rhetoric, people's sensations and passions no longer seemed quite so mild and pliable as they had been portrayed by the young Hume, nor did these passions seem reducible to rational calculation, as Smith had argued.

In this atmosphere, it is no wonder that the Utilitarian moral theorist Henry Sidgwick found to his dismay that beliefs cannot in fact be rationally argued upon Utilitarian grounds, but must rest solely on personal "intuition." His plaintive cry was that "where he had looked for Cosmos, he had in fact found only Chaos" (quoted in MacIntyre 1981: 63). But in fact chaos is the only possible consequences of the welter of fundamentally incommensurate and equally compelling personal desires that lie at the core of the Humean paradigm.

But despite philosophical and practical difficulties, the imagery of "possessive individualism" remained deeply embedded within the thought of Western society because it correlates with and serves to validate the economic structure. It is the paradigm for human character held, for professional reasons, by economists, and it remains a generally accepted folk model for human action, "explaining" and unmasking all behavior as an attempt to "get something" for the self.

The Philosophy of the Superior Man: Mill and Nietzsche

There is, however, an alternative model of human character that we can discover in muted form in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, and far more clearly in the heated writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Mill, who dominated English social thought throughout much of the 19th century, made a last-ditch attempt to bring philosophical order out of the chaos of Utilitarianism. He was a complex thinker who realized early on that a strict calculation of pleasure was inade-